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HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?
DIRECTOR EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND ITS ROLE
IN THE INDEPENDENCE ASSESSMENT
Joseph P. Farano ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

The fallout of the Enron debacle spurred legislative and regulatory activity aimed at strengthening corporate governance and pre1
venting another corporate implosion. Confronting shattered investor confidence, Congress responded to these corporate governance
2
fiascos by enacting the now infamous Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), meanwhile, called
3
on the self-regulatory organizations (SROs), specifically the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq, to re-examine and
strengthen their own listing and corporate governance standards, in
4
particular those related to the qualifications of directors and officers.
In response, the SROs enacted comprehensive reforms to their corporate governance provisions, designed to “restore investor confidence by . . . ensuring the independence of directors and strengthen5
ing corporate-governance practices.”

∗

J.D., 2007, summa cum laude, Seton Hall University School of Law; Associate,
Fried Frank, New York. The author would like to thank Professor Timothy P. Glynn
and Jason Haller for their invaluable guidance.
1
Douglas M. Branson, Enron—When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 989 (2003).
2
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
3
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. are
generally acknowledged as the nation’s two largest stock markets. See, e.g., Kate Kelly,
Big Board May Buy American Stock Exchange, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at C1.
4
Press Release, SEC, Pitt Seeks Review of Corporate Governance Conduct Codes
(Feb. 13, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-23.txt.
5
Press Release, NYSE, Inc., NYSE Files Changes to Listing Standards with SEC:
NYSE-Approved Measures Aim to Strengthen Corporate Accountability (Aug. 16,
2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/1044027444694.html; Press Release,
NASDAQ, Inc., Nasdaq Proposes Improvements to Corporate Governance Standards
to Benefit Investors (Apr. 12, 2002), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/Newsroom
/news/pr2002/ne_section02_084.html.
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Both Sarbanes-Oxley and the new SRO regulations prescribe an
agenda of greater independence, although they take different approaches and focus on different areas. Sarbanes-Oxley focuses on the
independence of company auditors and an audit committee of inde6
pendent directors to oversee the independent auditors. The SROs
took a broader approach by creating independence criteria for a majority of the board and affirmatively requiring a compensation committee and a nominating/corporate governance committee (“nominating committee”), each comprised entirely of independent
7
directors. Both Sarbanes-Oxley and the SROs provide certain objective criteria to aid in the assessment of a director’s independence.
For example, both prohibit directors who are also executive officers
8
from claiming independence. The criteria they provide, however,
are inconsistent in their approach to equity ownership by directors.
Sarbanes-Oxley creates a safe harbor for non-employee directors
holding ten percent of the company equity, but directors holding
9
over that amount cannot claim the safe harbor. The SROs, however,
eschew thresholds in favor of conflicting guidance in their rule commentary that simultaneously highlights and downplays equity owner10
ship as a factor affecting independence. Consequently, the role that
stock ownership should play in the independence assessment is un11
clear.
This Comment considers the role of equity ownership from the
perspective of the SROs’ goals, and takes the position that equity
ownership, if it should play any role in the independence assessment,
should weigh solely in favor of finding independence. While many of
the arguments made here may be equally applicable to assessing the
6

148 CONG. REC. H1540, 1540–41 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Sessions) (Sarbanes-Oxley sought to “ensure auditor independence . . . [and] increase corporate disclosure and responsibility”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
10A(m) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. IV 2004)) (requiring
board audit committees to be comprised entirely of independent directors).
7
See generally NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A (2006), available at
http://www.nyse.com/lcm/lcm_section.html (select “Section 3 Corporate Responsibility,” then select “303A.00 Corporate Governance Standards”) [hereinafter NYSE
Manual] (setting out the Corporate Governance Standards); NASDAQ, Inc., Nasdaq
Manual Online § 4350(c) (2006), available at http://nasdaq.complinet.com/nasdaq
/display/display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=1014 [hereinafter NASDAQ Manual]
(setting out the Qualitative Listing Requirements for Nasdaq Issuers, provisions relating to independence of directors).
8
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m); NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A; NASDAQ Manual,
supra note 7, § 4200(a)(15).
9
See infra Part II.A.
10
See infra Part II.B.
11
See infra Part III.
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independence of audit committee members, the audit committee
raises special concerns about fraud that cannot be completely re12
For its part, the SEC should
solved by an equity position alone.
modify its taxonomy if it maintains its current posture toward audit
13
committee equity ownership.
Following this introduction, Part II will discuss the statutory and
regulatory background defining director independence, now codified
14
in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and
15
SRO regulations. Part III explores the interrelationships of these
materials and the resulting confusion about what role equity positions play in the abstract definitions of “independence,” and considers the effects that confusion can have on reporting companies and
their investors. Part IV describes the benefits of director equity ownership. Finally, Part V proposes that, because significant equity ownership advances the SROs’ corporate governance goals, a director’s
equity stake should not be considered when determining whether a
director is independent. It also demonstrates how this approach
would be consistent with the existing regulatory framework and furthers the SROs’ purposes for demanding independence.

12

Insofar as the SEC is concerned with independence from management, as the
SROs are, the position this Comment takes with respect to SRO rules may well be
equally applicable to the SEC rules. It is a tenuous position to take, however, to argue that the largest shareholders (i.e., the owners) should be overseeing management as well as their own audit—an area that requires a level of detachment that an
equity interest cannot provide. See infra Part IV. For an interesting perspective on
the ineffectiveness of audit committee independence on financial statement quality,
see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–33 (2005).
13
For example, the SEC could elect to replace “independent” with “outside” directors for the audit committee. “Outside” directors are defined as “nonemployee
director[s] with little or no direct interest in the corporation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 493
(8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). Cf. id. (an inside director is a “director who is also
an employee, officer, or major shareholder of the corporation”) (emphasis added). The
concept of “outside directors” is not foreign to the SROs. NYSE Manual, supra note
7, § 303.01 (“Since 1956 the Exchange has required all domestic companies listing
on the Exchange to have at least two outside directors on their boards.”). The new
§ 303A provisions superseded the § 303 provisions that referenced outside directors,
and they were removed on Sept. 9, 2005. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York
Stock Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Deletion of Superseded Corporate Governance Standards,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-52396, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,430, 54,430 (Sept. 14, 2005).
14
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. IV 2004).
15
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A; NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7,
§ 4200(a)(15).

FARANO_FINALV2

756

4/11/2008 10:48:59 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:753

II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY DEFINITIONS OF
DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE
This Part provides a background on the differing approaches to
director equity ownership taken by Sarbanes-Oxley, the SROs, and
traditional court analyses. Consistent with the SEC’s charge to prevent market fraud perpetrated through inaccurate corporate disclo16
sures, Sarbanes-Oxley directs the SEC to require audit committees
to be composed solely of independent directors to oversee the audit
17
of those disclosures. In assuming their broader role in corporate
18
governance, the SROs require a majority of independent directors
on the board and exclusively independent directors on the nominat19
ing and compensation committees. Both Sarbanes-Oxley and the
SROs prescribe minimum criteria to be met before a director may be
20
considered “independent.” These objective definitions depart from
traditional notions of independence insofar as they attempt to define
independence in the abstract, rather than in context as a court would
21
do. While bright-line rules are favored for providing certainty for
22
those who plan around them, the differing standards prescribed by
Sarbanes-Oxley and the SROs introduce their own ambiguity about
what role equity ownership by directors, historically viewed as a positive incentive to monitor corporate activity, should play in the independence analysis under the new regulations.
To follow this Comment’s use of “equity,” it is important to recognize that stock is usually comprised of two features—an equity interest and a voting interest. Equity interest generally means a property (or financial) interest in a company that is typically associated
16

See infra Part V; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745 (2002) (“An Act [t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws . . . .”).
17
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m).
18
See infra Part V.
19
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, §§ 303A.01, .04–.05.
20
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m), with NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A, and
NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7, § 4200(a)(15).
21
See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 941 (Del. Ch. 2003).
This contextual approach is a strength of our law, as even the best
minds have yet to devise across-the-board definitions that capture all
the circumstances in which the independence of directors might reasonably be questioned. By taking into account all circumstances, the
Delaware approach undoubtedly results in some level of indeterminacy, but with the compensating benefit that independence determinations are tailored to the precise situation at issue.
Id.
22
Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 596 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“A brightline rule brings clarity and predictability . . . .”).
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23

with most benefits of stock ownership, although the term “equity”
24
can also be used as a synonym for a share of stock. A voting interest
25
generally attaches to an equity interest, although voting and equity
26
are severable concepts that permit corporations to issue shares with
27
non-proportional voting rights. This Comment uses the term “equity” to mean stock comprised of an equity interest and a propor28
tional voting right.
A. Sarbanes-Oxley and the Rules Pursuant to It
Sarbanes-Oxley’s impact on director independence has been
limited to those directors who serve on a company audit committee
29
that is responsible for overseeing the company auditors. Those pro30
visions are embodied in Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act,
and direct the SEC to create rules that prohibit any company not in
compliance with that section from being listed on a national ex31
change. Pursuant to that directive, the SEC defined independence
32
in Rule 10A-3.

23

Cf. Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote Corporate LongTerm Productivity, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 1016 (2004) (describing how the benefits derived by ensuring substantial equity ownerships could be advanced by requiring
directors to retain stock received under compensation agreements).
24
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (8th ed. 2004) (equity is “[a]n ownership interest
in property, esp[ecially] in a business,” but can also mean “[a] share in a publicly
traded company”).
25
CHESTER ROHRLICH ET AL., ORGANIZING CORPORATE & OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES § 3.02[2] (6th ed. 2007) (“When financing takes the form of classic ‘equity,’ the investor ordinarily obtains some control powers, including some voting
power . . . .”).
26
See Kimble C. Cannon & Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minority Shareholder
Rights Under Delaware Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual Claimants and Maximizing
Long-Term Share Value by Restricting Directorial Discretion, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 725,
754 (1995) (“[Delaware] Code recognizes the difference between voting and equity
interest by providing separate means of protection for the two interests . . . .”).
27
Frank Partnoy, Robert Clark’s Corporate Law: Twenty Years of Change: Financial Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 799, 811 (2006) (“[C]orporations issue
multiple classes of equity, with different voting or dividend rights . . . .”).
28
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975) (defining the
five general characteristics of stock as embodying (1) the right to receive dividends,
(2) negotiability, (3) ability to hypothecate, (4) “voting rights in proportion to the number
of shares owned” and (5) the ability to appreciate in value (emphasis added)).
29
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2)–(3) (Supp. IV 2004).
30
Id. § 78j-1.
31
Id. § 78j-1(m)(1).
32
Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A3(b)(1)(ii) (2006). The following discussion is confined to non-investment compa-
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Without affirmatively defining what an independent director is,
the SEC has provided some objective criteria specifying what an independent director is not. Rule 10A-3 provides that to be considered
independent, a director cannot accept any “consulting, advisory, or
other compensatory” fees from the company other than in the direc33
tor’s capacity as a board or committee member. Likewise, the director may not “be an affiliated person of” the company, other than in
34
the director’s capacity as a board or committee member. Executive
officers, employees, general partners, and managing members of affiliate entities are deemed “affiliates” based solely on their relation35
ship with the affiliated entity.
A director who owns substantial equity in the company he serves
might be disqualified from being independent under Rule 10A-3 if
his equity position gives him the status of “affiliate.” The term “affiliate” itself is defined as a person who “controls, or is controlled by, or
36
is under common control with,” the company. “Control” is defined
as the power to direct management, “whether through the ownership of
37
voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” Thus by owning a substantial equity position in the company, a director might be disqualified from being independent because his equity position provides
control of the company, earning him the status of “affiliate” in a ca38
pacity other than as a board or committee member.
Recognizing the potential disqualifying effect of equity owner39
ship, the SEC provided a safe harbor threshold under which any
person (other than an executive officer) who is a beneficial owner of
ten percent or less of the voting equity securities of a company is

nies, although similar rules exist for investment companies. See id. § 240.10A3(b)(1)(iii).
33
Id. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(ii).
34
Id.
35
Id. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(iii).
36
Id. § 240.10A-3(e)(1). When used elsewhere in the act, “affiliate” is given the
meaning assigned under the Investment Company Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(19)
(2000); see also id. § 80a-2(a)(3)(A)) (defining “affiliated person” to include a person
who holds five percent of the company’s voting securities).
37
Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(4)
(emphasis added).
38
See id. “Equity position,” as used in this Comment, means beneficial ownership
of company equity. Note that additional criteria, not inconsistent with those under
the SRO regulations, will presume affiliate status, such as employment by the company or employment by another affiliate of the company. Id. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(iii).
39
See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,793 (Apr. 9, 2003).
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deemed not to be in control of the company. This safe harbor provision expressly disavows any presumption of affiliate status for per41
sons exceeding the threshold. A director who exceeds this thresh42
old, however, is not entitled to the safe harbor presumption. For a
director outside the threshold, the board will have to perform a facts
and circumstances analysis to determine whether that director has
43
“control” over the company.
B. SRO Regulations
The SRO regulations require that the audit committee members
44
also meet the SROs’ independence tests, but add additional requirements for the board and establish membership requirements for
45
committees other than the audit committee.
For example, the
NYSE requires that a majority of the board members be inde46
pendent and that the board has both a compensation and a nomi47
nating committee comprised entirely of independent directors.
Members of the compensation committee set the compensation levels
48
for executives, while the nominating committee members are
charged with nominating new directors and recommending corpo49
rate governance guidelines to the board.
40

Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(1)(ii)(A)(1). Beneficial ownership is determined
under Regulation 13D. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3. A beneficial owner is one who has voting or investment power over shares of the company, through any relationship. Id.
41
17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(ii)(B).
42
Id. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(ii)(A)(1).
43
Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. at 18,793.
44
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.07(b).
45
See id. § 303A; see also NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7, § 4200(c). Although the
NYSE and the Nasdaq rules are substantially similar, the NYSE rules are arguably
more stringent in certain respects. Compare NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.05
(requiring companies to have a compensation committee), with NASDAQ Manual,
supra note 7, § 4350(c)(3) (allowing compensation of officers to be determined by a
compensation committee or by a majority of independent directors; a special committee is not required). For this reason, this Comment will focus on the NYSE rules,
but will address the Nasdaq rules where they evince a departure that is material to
the discussion. Note that the SRO regulations address audit committee independence insofar as they require, at a minimum, compliance with the SEC rules. NYSE
Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.06 (requiring compliance with SEC Rule 10A-3); accord
NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7, § 4350(d) (same); see also NYSE Manual, supra note
7, § 303A.07 (providing additional criteria such as a requirement of three independent directors on the audit committee) (emphasis added).
46
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.01.
47
Id. §§ 303A.04–.05.
48
Id. § 303A.05.
49
Id. § 303A.04.
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The NYSE regulations, like the SEC rules, do not define what an
independent director is, but instead require the board to “affirmatively determine[] that the director has no material relationship with
50
the listed company.” Once identified, independent directors and
the criteria used to select them must be disclosed in the company
51
proxy or Form 10-K. The regulations set out some objective criteria
that will defeat independence, for example, employment by the
company within the last three years, payments to the director or a
family member exceeding $100,000 over three years (other than
payments for their capacity as a director), and certain relationships
52
with the company auditor. The regulations are primarily concerned
with independence from management and maintain that ownership
of even “a significant amount of stock, by itself,” will not bar an inde53
pendence finding.
In their original version of proposed regulations, the SROs took
the position that an absolute limit of twenty percent stock ownership
54
would apply to audit committee members.
Under the proposed
regulations, a person who held, or was associated with a person who
held, twenty percent or more of the company’s stock could not sit as
55
a voting member of the audit committee. No similar threshold was
56
proposed for the other committees.
These proposed regulations
were ultimately dropped, and the final regulations instead defer to
57
the SEC audit committee requirements and, in addition, require
compliance with the general SRO independence requirements pro58
vided for the board and other committees.
C.

Traditional Court Analysis

Providing a much less complex framework, the independence
inquiry under Delaware law has always been a contextual assessment.
When determining whether a director was independent in a given
situation, Delaware courts will review whether a director’s decision
was “based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board,”
50

Id. § 303A.02.
Id. § 303A.02(a) cmt.
52
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02.
53
Id. § 303A.02(a) cmt. (emphasis added).
54
NYSE, Inc., REPORT OF THE NYSE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING
STANDARDS COMMITTEE 11 (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/
corp_govreport.pdf.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.06.
58
Id. § 303A.07(b).
51
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or whether it was based on “extraneous considerations or influ59
This case-by-case approach is embodied in the “business
ences.”
judgment rule,” a product of common law that affords directors a
60
presumption that they acted in “the best interests of the company.”
The Delaware approach results in a far more open-ended inquiry. Rather than provide an abstract definition, the independence
inquiry begins by determining from what or whom the director
should be independent, and for what purpose, and then evaluates the
61
director’s relationship with that person or entity. At the core of the
inquiry, Delaware courts will consider a director as not independent
if he is, “for any substantial reason, incapable of making a decision”
62
solely in the best interests of the company. For example, where a
director must be independent from a director with a personal interest in a transaction, the director may not be independent if he is “be63
holden,” or obliged, to the interested director. “Beholden” encompasses more than financial obligations and can include personal and
64
Close personal relationships that border on
other relationships.
65
family ties, colleagueship outside of the board, and even a prior pro66
fessor-student relationship have come into the equation. Naturally,
such a review can only be transaction-dependent and contextual insofar as it is used to review specific relationships of a director in the
context of reviewing specific actions of the board.
III. THE EFFECTS OF INCONGRUOUS INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS
This Part will discuss how the competing approaches of the SRO
regulations and securities laws, despite providing some objective criteria, create ambiguity about how director equity ownership factors
67
into an independence determination. Indeed, “[t]he lack of any serious underlying theory of independent director motivation is star-

59

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984).
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (citing
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995)).
61
See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004).
62
In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2002).
63
Id. at 938–39.
64
Id.
65
Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050.
66
In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d at 942.
67
Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 157 (2006) (“While ‘independence’ has generally proven fairly
easy to conceptualize, if more difficult to define in precise legislative language, one
area in which substantial disagreement exists even in principle is that of the significance to be given to stock ownership by the putatively independent director.”).
60
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68

tlingly manifest.” This uncertainty can have the effect of dissuading
venture capitalists, mutual fund managers, and other investors with
substantial equity stakes from confidently asserting their independ69
ence and serving crucial roles on the board. Depriving young companies of the management expertise of venture capitalists in an era
where initial public offerings are increasingly backed by venture capital, and indeed some industries are predominantly financed by such
70
71
capital, can inhibit growth and ultimately shareholder value.
Moreover, venture capitalists, mutual and pension fund managers,
and other institutional representatives constitute a substantial pool of
managerial talent that could contribute independent directors to
72
Yet these
corporate boards and improve corporate governance.
73
corporate backers are left to operate in an uncertain framework, an
68

Id. at 160.
See Letter from Mark G. Heesen, President, National Venture Capital Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (May 8, 2003), available at http://sec.gov/
rules/sro/nyse200233/nationalven050803.htm (Commenting on the proposed SRO
regulations, Mr. Heesen stated that the National Venture Capital Association “is particularly sensitive to the risk that new definitions of director independence in the
Proposed Rules could have the unfortunate effect of limiting the ability of venture
capitalists to serve on audit and compensation committees.”).
70
Malcolm Baker & Paul A. Gompers, The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering, 46 J.L. & ECON. 569, 572–73 (2003).
71
See James Edward Harris, Level Five Philanthropy: Designing a Plan for Strategic,
Effective, Efficient Giving, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19, 34 (2003) (Venture capitalists “add value through the depth of their engagement by bringing expertise to the
board, making valuable connections, recruiting and mentoring management talent.”
They condition additional investments “upon demonstrating progress toward performance measures that will lead to long-term growth.”).
72
William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Views from the Bench: The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents
of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 992–96 (2003); Heesen, supra note 69 (“[A]
recognition of the independence of directors who represent large venture capital
shareholdings is critical to the effectiveness of these Proposed Rules in populating
boards and committees with experienced, financially savvy, independent directors.”).
73
MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND
THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 7–8, 77 (2007), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf. In a report commissioned
by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and U.S. Senator Charles Schumer, McKinsey & Company interviewed financial services industry executives and investor groups, and
worked with experts on financial regulations to assess their views on maintaining U.S.
financial services leadership. Id. A strong concern arising out of this research is the
perceived legal unpredictability caused by the “inherent complexity” of the U.S.
regulatory framework. Id. “[T]he system’s inherent complexity has the unfortunate side
effect of making it harder to manage legal risk in the US than in many other jurisdictions. .
. . Legal experts indicated that this is a major reason why many corporations now
choose English law to govern their international commercial contracts.” Id. (emphasis added). New York’s legislature encourages businesses to select New York as their
forum. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1401 to -1402 (Consol. 2006) (permitting
69
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undesirable consequence in view of the positive role director equity
74
ownership plays in corporate governance.
What dissuades these various actors is threefold. First, the most
generous consequences of a failure to comply with SRO listing re75
quirements are suspension and removal from the exchange. Second, in contrast to Delaware’s contextual assessment, companies
must disclose which directors are independent and how the determination of their independence status was made in the company’s an76
nual proxy statement or Form 10-K filed with the SEC. Such disclosures, in advance of any alleged wrongdoing, could subject the
company to SEC scrutiny and liability (and, some would argue, vexa77
tious lawsuits ) under the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange
78
Act. Third, the SRO independence status of a director, determined
in a transaction-independent context, may be unfairly extended to
assessments of independence in judicial review of a director’s deci79
sions, where the courts have historically eschewed categorization before considering why a director should be independent and from
80
whom the director should be independent.
The cause of this uncertainty comes from the interrelationship
of SEC and SRO regulations and how they address director equity
ownership. The ambiguity begins with the audit committee requirements and the ten percent voting stock threshold created by the non81
affiliate safe harbor under the SEC rules, and the uncertain import
of failing to be within the threshold. Delaware jurists William Chan-

choice of New York law or choice of New York forum for transactions unrelated to
New York but “covering, in the aggregate,” $250,000 for choice of law or $1,000,000
for forum selection).
74
See generally infra Part IV.
75
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 801.00.
76
Id. § 303A.02(a) cmt.
77
BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 73, at 100–01, 104 (discussing the prevalence of “meritless” lawsuits and the pressure it puts on companies to settle and avoid
the high costs of litigation). Former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, whose widely
recognized work fighting Wall Street firms as New York’s attorney general helped
earn him his position as governor, threw his support behind the report. Aaron Lucchetti, Why Spitzer Is Backing Study That Endorses Less Regulation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,
2007, at C3.
78
See, e.g., Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2006) (providing liability for false or misleading statements of material fact in corporate disclosures).
79
Chandler & Strine, supra note 72, at 998 (asserting that, where traditional independence inquiries are transaction specific, courts must be cautious not to rest
their independence inquiry on the status assigned by the regulations).
80
Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004).
81
Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)
(ii)(B) (2006).

FARANO_FINALV2

764

4/11/2008 10:48:59 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:753

dler and Leo Strine posited that that the ten percent threshold acts as
a per se bar to qualification of a director whose beneficial ownership
82
exceeds that level from serving on the audit committee because of
the negative implication of not being able to claim the safe harbor.
Indeed, many commentators to the proposed rule were also concerned that a fixed level would raise a presumption of non83
independence.
In response to these concerns, the SEC now ex84
pressly disavows such a presumption in the Rule itself, but it cannot
be denied that as a result of this threshold, a director with a large equity position has a “taint that, at best, can be explained away,” even if
85
only for audit committee purposes. The possibility remains that a
director who might otherwise be independent will be disqualified
from serving on the audit committee solely because of his equity position. This possibility suggests that at some point, a director is no
longer independent for audit committee purposes when he or she
86
exceeds some indeterminate threshold of beneficial ownership.
This “taint” might affect the independence analysis under the
SRO regulations where a director would also assert his or her independence. Key corporate functions are performed by nomination
and compensation committees that must be comprised of entirely in87
dependent directors, and indeed the board itself must be comprised
88
of a majority of independent directors. If this taint carries over to
the analyses under the SRO regulations, board membership itself may
be foreclosed to beneficial owners of large equity positions.
In applying the same independence requirements to the board
as they do to the audit committee, the SROs further blur the lines be89
tween these two regimes, making it difficult to disentangle the
meaning of independence in one context from its meaning in the
other. The SROs, of course, require that audit committees comply

82

Chandler & Strine, supra note 72, at 990–91. William Chandler and Leo Strine
are Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor, respectively, of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Id. at 953.
83
Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,793 (Apr. 9, 2003).
84
17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(ii)(B).
85
Chandler & Strine, supra note 72, at 989–90.
86
See Clarke, supra note 67, at 158 (“Congress . . . could be seen as viewing substantial ownership of securities as undesirable in independent directors.”).
87
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, §§ 303A.04–.05 (2006).
88
Id. § 303A.01.
89
Id. § 303A.07(b) (“In addition to any requirement of Rule 10A-3(b)(1), all audit committee members must satisfy the requirements for independence set out in
Section 303A.02.”).
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with the Sarbanes-Oxley independence requirements.
The dilemma is that the SROs also require the audit committee members to
91
be independent under the SRO regulations. Thus a director on the
audit committee must be independent under both Sarbanes-Oxley
92
and the SRO regulations. A director on the compensation committee, however, need only qualify under the SRO regulations—and may
so qualify even though, under Sarbanes-Oxley, he may be disqualified
93
from sitting on the audit committee because of a large equity stake.
The result is a system in which a director on the audit committee is
independent under the same SRO regulations as a director who is
not independent for audit committee purposes, yet the SROs would
label both directors “independent” and both must pass the same SRO
independence tests. While not purporting to place emphasis on
stock ownership, the NYSE regulations do suggest that stock ownership is at least a factor that adversely affects an independence determination by stating that stock ownership will not by itself preclude in94
Adding to the uncertainty is the SROs’ hostility
dependence.
toward significant equity ownership in their initial recommendation
95
of a twenty percent threshold for audit committee membership. Yet
all these indications of similarity between the seemingly firm
Sarbanes-Oxley approach and the SRO approach are at odds with the
NYSE’s claim that it “does not view ownership of even a significant
96
amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to an independence finding.” In
addition, although the SRO independence requirements also apply
to the audit committee, the fact that the SRO requirements are “in
addition” to the SEC requirements suggests that they supply some dif97
ference. What results is simply an unclear position on equity ownership.

90

Id. § 303A.02(a).
Id. Not without good reason—much of the additional objective criteria under
SRO regulations are well reasoned, e.g., transaction-based prohibitions, id. §
303A.02(b)(v), and not as clearly delineated in the SEC regulations. See Listing
Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(ii) (2006).
92
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.07(b).
93
See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
94
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt. (“[T]he Exchange does not
view ownership of even a significant amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to an independence finding.”) (emphasis added).
95
NYSE, INC., REPORT OF THE NYSE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING
STANDARDS COMMITTEE 11 (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/
corp_govreport.pdf.
96
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt.
97
Id. § 303A.07(b).
91
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This uncertainty about the role of equity ownership might dis98
courage venture capitalists, who often seek board representation,
from participating in corporate governance because their equity stake
makes them uncertain candidates for “independent” roles under the
regulatory framework. A poignant example can be found in a recent
proxy statement filed with the SEC, in which the company indicated
that three directors would not be independent under NYSE standards, based solely on their affiliate status under SEC Regulations,
because their employment with a private equity fund gave them a
99
large beneficial ownership in the company.
The confusion is not simply a product of the regulatory language, but is also fueled by advocacy groups that simultaneously
promote and condemn director share ownership. In a less than clear
position on equity ownership, Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS), a leading proxy advisement firm that provides guidance to in100
stitutional holders on how to vote their proxies, internally classifies
a director who beneficially owns ten percent or more voting or equity
stock as a “Non-Independent Non-Executive Director” in its interna101
tional voting guidelines; yet, in its U.S. voting guidelines, ISS sets
the threshold at fifty percent beneficial ownership of the companies
102
voting shares before being considered an “Inside Director.”
While
these conflicting guidelines make ISS’s position on a safe level of director equity ownership uncertain, ISS nonetheless maintains that di103
Yet
rectors should hold some equity in the companies they serve.
98

Bruce Taragin, Venture Capital 101, at 4 (Nov. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.blumbergcapital.com/white_papers/files/VC101.pdf, reprinted in JAY B.
ABRAMS, HOW TO VALUE YOUR BUSINESS AND INCREASE ITS POTENTIAL 223–41 (2004)
(“VCs are price sensitive, active investors who seek Board representation . . . .”).
99
Sterling Chemicals, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF14A), at 16
(Mar. 16, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1014669/
000095012906002747/h33413ddef14a.htm. The private equity fund Resurgence Asset Management was the beneficial owner of a “substantial majority” of Sterling
Chemicals’ securities. Id.
100
Alan Murray, Frustrated “Greens” Turn to Boardrooms, WALL ST. J., Jun. 7, 2006, at
A2 (explaining that ISS “advises pension funds and other institutions on how to vote
their corporate proxies”); Lingling Wei, Corporate Governance (A Special Report)—How
Am I Doing? Peer-based Evaluations Are Moving Slowly into the Boardroom, WALL ST. J., Oct.
9, 2006, at R5 (stating that ISS is the nation’s largest proxy-advisory firm).
101
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SVCS., ISS 2007 INTERNATIONAL PROXY VOTING
GUIDELINES SUMMARY 6 (Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/
2007InternationalSummaryGuidelines.pdf (international director classification, effective Feb. 1, 2007).
102
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SVCS., ISS 2007 US PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY
10 (Dec. 15, 2006) (U.S. director classification, effective Feb. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2007USSummaryGuidelines.pdf.
103
Id. at 15 (“[S]tock ownership on the part of directors is desired . . . .”).
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just as under the audit committee requirements, at some point a director’s beneficial ownership disqualifies her from being considered
independent, although exactly where that threshold is drawn in ISS’s
104
Considering the influence that ISS has
view is not well defined.
105
over shareholder votes and management decisions, a more concrete position is certainly warranted.
ISS is not alone in maintaining a confusing stance on director
equity ownership. Although taking a seemingly adamant position on
relationships with significant shareholders, International Corporate
Governance Network’s (ICGN) inconsistent position on share ownership contributes to the uncertainty about what role equity should
have. ICGN, an international organization focused on promoting
106
good corporate governance, disapproves of directors with relation107
ships to significant shareholders, while simultaneously encouraging
director equity ownership. ICGN promotes a board of directors who
exercise independent judgment in the best interests of the corporation and presumes that directors who have relationships with large
shareholders might be subject to influences extraneous to those of
108
the corporation.
In ICGN’s view, then, a director with a relation109
Not unlike
ship to a significant shareholder is never independent.
ISS, however, ICGN encourages director equity ownership and demands that every corporation have a policy of director share ownership for the purpose of aligning the interests of directors with those
110
of the shareholders “in a meaningful way.”

104

See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1439 (2002) (“A recent study found that voting recommendations by the ISS against management proposals are usually decisive, and the firm’s
stated views on a voting issue will often be critical as to whether management pursues
the issue.”).
106
Sara Calian, Global Panel Targets Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2002, at C16
(explaining that ICGN’s membership “includes asset managers from the United
Kingdom, other European nations, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Brazil—as well
as large U.S. groups such as the California Public Employees’ Retirement System”
and represents approximately $10 trillion in assets); ICGN.org, About the Network,
http://www.icgn.org/organisation/mission.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
107
INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, STATEMENT ON GLOBAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES § 5.5 (Jul. 8, 2005), available at http://www.icgn.org/organi
sation/documents/cgp/revised_principles_jul2005.php [hereinafter ICGN, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES] (setting out factors affecting independence, including relationships
with large shareholders).
108
Id. §§ 5.4–.5.
109
Note that “relationship” encompasses beneficial owners. Determination of
Beneficial Owner, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2006).
110
ICGN, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 107, § 5.18.
105
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The SROs’ “controlled company” exemptions create a paradox
that further complicates the analysis. A “controlled company” is a
listed company in which an individual, group, or other company
111
holds more than fifty percent of the voting power. Companies that
qualify for the exemption are excluded from the independent director requirements related to board and committee composition under
112
These exemptions recognize the right of majority
the SRO rules.
shareholders to select directors and have control over key deci113
The SROs added the exemptions in response to concerns
sions.
that requiring a majority of independent directors would have adverse consequences such as depriving rights of majority shareholders,
foreclosing family-owned companies’ owners from board membership, and discouraging venture capitalists from making a public offer114
ing. The exemptions have drawn sharp criticism, however, because
115
they undermine the safeguards the regulations otherwise provide.
Indeed, a controlled company is largely exempt from compliance
116
with the SROs’ independence rules.
Whatever the merits of the
exemption, its basis solely on beneficial ownership of voting shares
seems to imply that a person holding fifty percent of the company
117
Yet this implication is at odds
could never qualify as independent.
with the position taken elsewhere in the SRO rules that stock owner118
ship does not by itself bar an assertion of independence. Moreover,

111

NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7, § 4350(c)(5) (setting out the exemption under Qualitative Listing Requirements for Nasdaq Issuers Except for Limited Partnerships); NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00 (setting out the exemption in the introduction).
112
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00.
113
NASDAQ, Inc., IM-4350-4 Board Independence and Independent Committees
(Jan. 13, 2006), available at http://nasdaq.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/display
.html?rbid=1705&element_id=1019. Clearly this exemption is also important for
parent companies. Id.
114
NYSE, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to the NYSE’s Corporate Governance Rule Proposals 24 (2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/amend1-04-09-03.pdf (setting out the various concerns raised by commentators).
115
Deborah Solomon, Loophole Limits Independence—Dozens of Firms Use Exemption
That Allows Them to Avoid Rules Mandating Board Structure, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2004,
at C1 (“They also raise troubling issues at companies where a controlling shareholder
may have substantial voting interest but a small economic stake, the critics say.”).
116
Even under the exemption, the SROs retain the requirement that independent
directors must meet in regularly scheduled “executive sessions,” exclusive of nonindependent directors. NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7, § 4350(c)(5); accord NYSE,
Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00 (does not obviate section 303A.03 on executive session).
117
See NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00.
118
Id. § 303A.02(a) cmt.
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it suspends whatever protection might otherwise have been afforded
119
by the independence regulations.
120
Uncertainty comes at a cost.
While the SEC and the SROs
should be applauded for providing objective criteria to evaluate director independence, the obfuscated role of equity ownership in
these abstract definitions of independence is in need of some clarification. In restructuring their posture, the SROs should acknowledge
the positive effects of director equity ownership.
IV. THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENCE WITH EQUITY OWNERSHIP
Director equity ownership, if it plays any role in the independence analysis, should be a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of inde121
pendence. Independence is, of course, relative.
Complete independence can be achieved only through complete disinterest, that is,
absence of a positive incentive to engage in the company—an unde122
sirable attribute for a director.
The SROs, however, want to ensure that the directors maintain
123
Managerial oversight
independence from executive management.
is a pervasive theme of the SRO regulations that runs through the ob124
ligations of each of the required committees.
Independence from
management is best promoted by aligning the directors’ interests
with those of the shareholders to ensure effective managerial oversight. This section will discuss how that alignment has both historically and currently been achieved though director equity ownership.
Insofar as independence has historically been a contextual as125
sessment, Delaware case law assessing independence is instructive.
Delaware is considered to be “the most important state of incorpora126
tion in the United States,” and is the state of incorporation for a

119

Id. § 303A.00.
See BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 73, at ii.
121
Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004).
122
See Clarke, supra note 67, at 159–60 (stating that the purpose of having directors seems obscure if, in removing their ties to managerial interests, the regulatory
framework neglects “to substitute a tie to the interests of any other constituency”).
This result would leave no incentive to act in any predictable way, other than to avoid
liability. Id.
123
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt.
124
Id. §§ 303A.04–.05, .07.
125
See supra Part II.C.
126
Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 396 (2003); see also Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence
Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1782 (2002) (“Delaware
[is] by far the most successful state in the incorporation marketplace . . . .”).
120
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127

majority of public companies.
Moreover, most states look to Dela128
ware for corporate law precedents.
Recent Delaware case law continues to affirm the positive role
that equity ownership plays in keeping directors independent from
management by aligning their interests instead with the shareholders.
129
For example, in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, when Oracle
failed to make its quarterly projections, the Delaware Court of Chancery refused strict disgorgement liability for an officer who traded
while in possession of information that cast doubt on Oracle’s ability
130
to make those projections. The refusal, the court said, was based in
part on a concern that strict liability would “raise the barriers that already dissuade large, but not controlling, stockholders from serving
131
on company boards” because it would make it more difficult for a
director to trade in the company stock. The court emphasized that
132
having “as Ross Perot would say, ‘skin in the game’” by owning
company stock aligns insiders’ interests with those of the sharehold133
ers, a result that Delaware courts encourage.
The Oracle court surveyed a number of other Delaware decisions
where equity ownership lent credence to a director’s judgment be134
cause it aligned his interests with those of the shareholders.
For
135
example, in Unitrin v. American General Corp., the Supreme Court of
Delaware reasoned that outside directors who were substantial stockholders could not be presumed to value their board positions greater
than their economic interests as stockholders when voting in a proxy
136
contest. In such a contest, said the court, the stockholder-directors
have the same interests as the general stockholders: maximizing the

127

Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Executive Compensation and Takeovers: Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 780 n.74 (2002); Richard
A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a Start-Up Company,
56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 806 (2004).
128
Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29
IOWA J. CORP. L. 625, 663 n.200 (2004); see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV &
Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings
and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885, 903 (2002).
129
867 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, No. 561, 2005 Del. LEXIS 150 (Del. Apr.
14, 2005).
130
Id. at 929–30.
131
Id. at 931.
132
Id. at 930.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 930 n.116.
135
651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
136
Id. at 1380–81.
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138

value of their investment. Similarly, in In re Pennaco Holdings, Inc.,
the Delaware Court of Chancery held that, despite the prospect of a
substantial severance package for a change in control of the company, the corporate officers, who were also some of the largest shareholders, were unlikely to favor a sub-par takeover offer just to cash in
139
Implicitly, the court reached this reon their severance packages.
sult because the officers’ interests as equity holders were bound to be
140
greater than their personal interests in their severances. Moreover,
in response to a separate challenge of the board’s stock option grant
to itself, the court explicitly stated that such a grant served the permissible purpose of aligning the interests of the board with those of
141
the shareholders.
In the merger context, while assessing an alleged breach of the
board’s duty of loyalty in entering into a preferential transaction with
a pension trust in order to secure the pension trust’s support of the
142
merger, the court in IXC Communications Inc. v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc.
found that the interests of directors with substantial stock ownership
143
would likely be aligned with all of the company shareholders.
This
lent credibility to the board’s decision to enter the agreement where,
absent some other showing of self-interest, the challenged transaction
was not shown to be inconsistent with the interests of all the share144
holders.
In addition to the courts, Congress has acknowledged the important role that equity plays in ensuring that the interests of shareholders are paramount. Congress recently passed the Private Securi145
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA), which creates a
presumption in Exchange Act class action suits that the most adequate lead plaintiff is the person with the largest financial interest in
146
the action. This presumption can be rebutted only by showing that

137

Id. at 1380.
787 A.2d 691 (Del. Ch. 2001).
139
Id. at 709.
140
See id.
141
Id.
142
No. 17324, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
143
Id. at *17–*18.
144
Id.
145
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (1995).
146
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2000).
[T]he court shall adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff
in any private action . . . is the person or group of persons that[, in addition to filing requirements and otherwise being eligible under Fed138
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the person would not fairly protect the interests of the class, or that
the person is subject to unique defenses that might detract from his
147
ability to serve the class adequately.
PSLRA presents a situation analogous to the role of directors in
their oversight of corporate management. PSLRA was enacted to
provide oversight of lawyers in securities class actions, where lawyers
were perceived as managing the litigation unchecked and serving
148
their own interests. Much like the previously extant corporate governance regulatory framework was perceived as failing to constrain
149
self-interested management, the rules of professional conduct were
seen as ineffective in constraining plaintiffs’ attorneys in securities
150
class actions. Congress touted the PSLRA for putting investors with
151
significant financial interests in charge of their cases, acknowledging that shareholders with more to gain or lose will best serve the in152
terests of shareholder classes in exercising oversight.
Financial theory also provides sound support for the aligning effects of equity interest. Agency costs are a widely accepted theory on
the result of differing interests between management and sharehold153
Agency costs in the corporate context are the sum of (1) the
ers.
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23] . . . in the determination of the court,
has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class . . . .
Id.
147

Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). This is akin to the “no material relationship with”
the company portion of the SRO independence test. NYSE Manual, supra note 7,
§ 303A.02(a).
148
See 141 CONG. REC. S9199, S9212 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Domenici) (“[U]nder this reform lawyers are going to represent a class of people,
not a select plaintiff that they choose as pet plaintiffs. Lawyers are going to be more
responsible to the courts . . . .”).
149
Kathleen F. Brickey, White Collar Criminal Law in Comparative Perspective: The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 246 (2004).
150
Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053,
2065 (1995); see also Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of
Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 724 (2002) (discussing the potential
for excess lawyer control, inability of shareholders to monitor class counsel, and inability of courts to handle potential abuse through settlement review).
151
141 CONG. REC. S9199, S9212 (statement of Sen. Domenici) (“First, it puts investors with real financial interests, not lawyers[,] in charge of the case. It puts investors with real financial interests, not professional plaintiffs with one or two shares of
stock[,] in charge of the case.”).
152
141 CONG. REC. S8885, S8893 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen.
D’Amato) (“This bill says the institutional investors, the people who have billions in
pension funds, the retirees, those managers will have a greater stake in the case.”).
153
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV., 323–29 (1986), available at http://www.business.ecu
.edu.au/users/dallen/corporatefinance3/jensenfreecashflow.pdf (discussing con-
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costs of monitoring management, (2) the costs incurred by the company in instituting its own compliance control and ascertaining the
desires of the shareholders, and (3) the costs of a loss in value for the
shareholders for inevitable deviations from the ideal course of ac154
Agency costs arise from a divergence in interests between
tion.
stockholders and management where there is a “separation of owner155
ship and control,” with stockholders retaining ownership but management retaining control. To acknowledge the existence of agency
costs is to acknowledge that without the common interest created by
equity ownership, divergent interests can impede shareholders’ in156
Introducing equity ownership at the managerial
terests and value.
oversight level (the board of directors) provides the incentive to ensure shareholders’ interests are served. Said another way, “nonmanagement directors are there to help shareholders solve the
157
Indeed, many respected commentators agree
agency problem.”
that an equity interest can mitigate agency costs by “inducing man158
agement to care about shareholder interests.”
The NYSE itself
states that the “governance rules implemented in 2003 and 2004 em159
power independent directors as representatives of shareholders.”
The aligning effects of equity ownership raise unique theoretical
concerns that are inconsequential when viewed with the purpose of
independence under the SRO regulations, to wit, keeping the direc160
One concern with finding large
tors separate from management.
equity holders independent is the fear that a rift will form between
flicts of interest between shareholders and managers over free cash-flow payment
policies and how such conflicts can create agency costs).
154
See id.
155
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976).
156
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 850 (2005) (“In publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, the
interests of management do not fully overlap with those of shareholders, and management thus cannot be automatically counted on to take actions that would serve
shareholder interests. As a result, agency costs that reduce shareholder value might
arise.”).
157
Clarke, supra note 67, at 154.
158
E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 156, at 850. Lucian Bebchuk is the William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and
Director of the Program on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School. Prof.
Lucian A. Bebchuk, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk (last visited Feb.
28, 2007). He is a frequent commentator on corporate governance issues and an advocate for increased shareholder power in corporate governance. See id.
159
NYSE, Inc., Investor Protection, http://www.nyse.com/regulation/about/
1045516499685.html (follow “Listed-Company Compliance” hyperlink) (last visited
Jan. 24, 2007) (emphasis added).
160
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt.
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161

long-term and short-term interests of different shareholders.
Of
particular concern is the short-term view of corporate prospects that a
162
This
director associated with a venture capital fund might hold.
concern is echoed in positions such as that taken by ICGN, evident in
its fear of extraneous influences on directors’ decisions by large
163
While intellectually appealing, the argument misses
shareholders.
its mark in the SRO context because, even were such a rift to form, it
would not detract from keeping directors separate from management.
Financial theory demonstrates that a long- versus short-term
shareholder rift is unlikely because there is no opportunity for shortterm gains in valid corporate decision making. At the outset, it is not
at all clear—as a general proposition—that corporate actions favored
by short-term shareholders will necessarily conflict with those favored
164
by long-term shareholders.
A fundamental principal of financial
theory is that projects with a positive net present value (those with
long-term value regardless of their duration) increase the current
value of the firm to the benefit of both long-term and short-term
165
The obvious corollary is that projects with a poor or
shareholders.
negative net present value (those which will cause a net loss or a poor
return regardless of duration) reduce the current value of the en166
tity. With all projects—regardless of duration—priced into the pre161

See Robert D. Kraus, Inevitable Conflicts?: When a Venture Capitalist Is a Director,
BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 49–50, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
blt/2004-01-02/kraus.shtml.
162
Id.
163
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
164
See Bebchuk, supra note 156, at 884.
[C]onsider[ing] the potential costs that might be caused by shareholders with short horizons, such as institutional investors and traders that
follow high-turnover strategies . . . [, i]t is far from clear that the governance provisions favored by such shareholders would commonly deviate from those favored by long-term shareholders. If a governance arrangement is widely viewed as detrimental to long-term share value, its
long-run effect will likely be reflected in the company’s stock price
when the arrangement is adopted, and thus the short-run effect of its
adoption will likely be negative as well.
Id.
165
See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 23–24 (8th ed. 2006). Net present value is a formula for determining the present value of a prospect of a known duration. See id. Because the net
present value of undertaken projects are reflected in the current market value, regardless of the project’s timeframe, having a short-term interest in holding an equity
position does not diminish the need for taking a long-term view of corporate prospects. See id.
166
See id.
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sent value of the entity, rational directors should not take a shortterm view, even if their motives are purely financial and short-term,
because capital markets will discount the present market value of a
firm based on a project’s long-term effect on the value of the com167
Therefore, short-term decisions will be discounted in the
pany.
present stock price, thwarting the ability to make quick changes and
“cut and run” with a short-term gain.
A more troublesome situation might arise when a director who is
a venture capitalist, pension fund manager, or other significant investor faces an opportunity to sell the entity at a low price while under
168
pressure to exit the investment by the fund he manages. The director may favor voting for the transaction, although longer-term share169
holders may prefer to remain as an independent entity.
While by no means an impossible scenario, the obvious rejoinder
is that all shareholders have varying investment objectives which
might affect their decision to sell or remain; their only consensus will
170
be on their ultimate return on investment.
It is equally likely that
venture capitalists, pension fund managers, or other significant investors might be more interested in the long-term prospects of the firms
for which they serve as directors. Does their interest in the long term
prospects, fueling their desire to vote against such a transaction, render their actions inappropriate? A completely disinterested director

167

See id. at 350 (“[M]arket prices . . . impound all available information about the
value of each security . . . .”).
168
Kraus, supra note 161, at 50.
169
Id. Kraus discusses other hypothetical scenarios wherein the shareholder directors may have a “difference in viewpoint” with the common shareholders, particularly where the directors hold preferred shares, and provides the thoughtful admonition to venture capitalists to be wary of these potential conflicts when seeking board
positions, because of the risk of litigation that might challenge their decisions. Id. at
51. This Comment takes no position on the advisability of seeking board representation given the potential liability for any decisions a director makes, but offers the response that, as a practical matter, articulable conflicts can be made for seemingly any
given set of facts. See, e.g., Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2004)
(“[D]oubt might arise either because of financial ties, familial affinity, a particularly
close or intimate personal or business affinity or because of evidence that in the past
the relationship caused the director to act non-independently vis à vis an interested
director.”). Kraus does generally acknowledge, however, that a venture capitalist’s
main objective is to maximize his return, a “principle [that] should resonate with the
company itself as well as its other shareholders.” Kraus, supra note 161, at 50.
170
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386 (Del. 1995). See generally
Harvey L. Pitt, On the Precipice: A Reexamination of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Context of Hostile Acquisitions, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 811, 825–34 (1990) (discussing the complexity that is introduced during a takeover bid because shareholders have different
investment objectives and considering whether it is appropriate to distinguish among
these objectives).
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would have to make the same decision, but without the incentive that
an equity position provides to ensure the best deal possible for all
171
Moreover, such a director would have only his pershareholders.
sonal interest in retaining his professional fees or other benefits of
172
directorship, providing an incentive to remain entrenched that is at
173
odds with shareholders who would support a fairly priced sale.
Simply put, there is no way to guarantee that every investor’s subjective desires will be met in every transaction; the best approximation of
that end is to have the director’s interests aligned with the stockholders’ in the most meaningful way possible—an interest in securing a
return on their investment.
There is no argument that the “short-sighted venture capitalist”
situation would be “pronounced” when the transaction proceeds
might accrue solely to those investors, as preferred shareholders, and
174
leave little or nothing for the common shareholders.
Moreover,
the possibility does not warrant an exclusion from directorship before
the transaction occurs. A significant body of law condemns such fi175
nancial self-interest, and this exact scenario is ably handled by the

171

Cf. Clarke, supra note 67, at 159–60.
Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 870 (2003).
For example, in many large public corporations, outside directors do
have a nominal equity stake in the company, but receive far more substantial compensation in the form of annual fees, which often exceed
$90,000, in exchange for attendance at a few board meetings per annum. Such a compensation system, of course, is wholly inadequate to
promote the kind of personal incentive necessary to create an active
board.
Id.
173
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953–54 (Del. 1985) (explaining that when a corporation deals in its own stock, it may deal selectively with its
shareholders, “provided the directors have not acted out of a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office”); see also Am. Gen. Corp. v. Unitrin, Inc., No.
13656, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 187, at *31–*32 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994) (finding that
the “prestige and perquisites” of directorship, even absent a salary, could cause directors to “reject an excellent offer unless it includes this value in its ‘price parameter’”), rev’d, 651 A.2d 1361, 1380–81 (Del. 1995) (reversing on appeal because the
directors, who were also substantial shareholders, could not be presumed to value their
interest in their directorship over their own economic interest as shareholders).
174
Kraus, supra note 161, at 50.
175
See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 (Del. Ch. 2002). An interest precluding application of the business judgment rule exists when (1) a director receives
a benefit, (2) from the transaction, (3) “which is not generally shared with . . . the
other shareholders of his corporation,” and (4) that benefit is materially significant
to that director. Id.
172
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176

courts.
It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a director
would be more likely to be accused of having a financial self-interest.
Where a personal conflict of interest exists, directors must demonstrate the “entire fairness” of the transaction, or face severe personal
177
liability for their actions.
The short-term view concern might have more force in the context of the audit committee, a situation which raises special concerns
about short-sighted interests held by those charged with monitoring
178
the adequacy of audit controls.
In the audit committee situation,
concerns about short-term interest may not be completely dissipated
by an equity position, no matter how well aligned shareholder and director interests may be. Without proper oversight by parties with no
personal stake in the firm’s financial performance, creative account179
As
ing could escape review and temporarily inflate market value.
Enron investors lament, these types of fraudulent accounting prac176

E.g., In re Tele-Comms., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16470, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS
206, at *30 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2005) (“Because a clear and significant benefit . . . accrued primarily . . . to such directors controlling such a large vote of the corporation,
at the expense of another class of shareholders to whom was owed a fiduciary duty, then a
standard of entire fairness applies.” (emphasis added)); see also Blue Chip Capital
Fund II L.P. v. Tubergen, 906 A.2d 827, 830, 834 (Del. Ch. 2006) (where plaintiffs
alleged that defendant directors with preferred shares approved an asset valuation in
an attempt to maximize the preferred shareholder profits, dismissed fiduciary claim
without prejudice because a remedy lied in contract, but would permit the fiduciary
claim if the contractual remedy were inadequate).
177
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) (“[D]irectors are required to
demonstrate both their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness
of transactions in which they possess a financial, business or other personal interest
which does not devolve upon the corporation or all stockholders generally.”). In
such a situation the directors would be required to prove the “entire fairness” of the
transaction, both as to price and as to procedure. Id.
178
See generally Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,815 (Apr. 9,
2003) (providing standards that relate to “the audit committee’s responsibility to select and oversee the issuer’s independent accountant; procedures for handling complaints regarding the issuer’s accounting practices; the authority of the audit committee to engage advisors; and funding for the independent auditor and any outside
advisors engaged by the audit committee”).
179
E.g., McClendon, supra note 23, at 974–75 (describing how Enron executives
created an “illusion of exploding cash flow” and “capitalized on this manipulation”
by acquiring stock under compensation plans and “disposing of those shares prior to
the issuance of financial restatements that caused a dramatic decline in stock price”);
Nathan Wilda, David Pays for Goliath’s Mistakes: The Costly Effect Sarbanes-Oxley Has on
Small Companies, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 671, 674 (2004) (Enron undertook “extensive fraudulent accounting practices and business partnerships that inflated its stock
price dramatically. When Enron was forced to restate its earnings and account for
the hidden liabilities, it reported enormous losses resulting in a free-falling stock
price.”).
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180

tices are not without their practitioners.
Thus, the SEC’s hostility
toward equity ownership by audit committee members may be justified.
The concern echoed in the SRO amendments, however, is inde181
Independence from management is
pendence from management.
readily accomplished through ensuring director equity ownership
and alignment with the shareholders’ interests. From this perspective, the SROs should encourage directors to take a substantial equity
stake in the corporations they serve. Yet the ambiguity introduced by
Sarbanes-Oxley and the recent amendments to the SRO regulations
182
Thus, the SROs
obfuscate the role that equity ownership plays.
need to take a more firm position in favor of equity ownership in
their independence criteria.
V.

EQUITY OWNERSHIP SHOULD HAVE NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON AN
INDEPENDENCE ASSESSMENT

The SROs should amend their objective criteria to affirm that
equity ownership will not affect the independence assessment—no
matter what ownership interest a director may have—and take a position in the commentary that favors director equity ownership. This
change is supported by the SROs’ purposes in demanding director
independence. It could also improve corporate governance in general by eliminating the need for the controlled company exemption,
while retaining the general notion of independence embodied in the
183
remainder of the requirements. Moreover, legislative history seems
to suggest that the ambiguity the SROs created was not their original
intention.
This Part will discuss the general purposes of independence under the SRO rules and demonstrate that this proposal is not only consistent with the current regulatory scheme, but could also improve
corporate governance generally by furthering the SROs’ stated goals.

180

See supra note 179; see also John R. Emshwiller, Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prison—
Enron Ex-CEO Faced Longer Term for Fraud, Conspiracy Conviction; Victims Fund to Get $45
Million, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2006, at C1 (describing the recent sentencing of Jeffrey
Skilling, the former Enron CEO, for his involvement in Enron’s frauds).
181
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt. (2006).
182
See supra Part III.
183
E.g., NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02 (requiring an affirmative finding of
independence by the board, prohibiting recent employment by the company, and
other requirements).

FARANO_FINALV2

2008]

4/11/2008 10:48:59 AM

COMMENT

779

A. Unintended Consequences
Legislative history of the new regulations suggests that the SROs
184
did not intend to give equity ownership a scarlet letter.
The NYSE
added commentary indicating that stock ownership alone was not a
bar to independence in response to concerned venture capitalists
and commentators who sought “clarification of the interaction be185
In the SEC Release
tween share ownership and independence.”
approving the proposed SRO regulations, the SEC took notice of a
commentator who “expressed its strong support for the position
taken by both the NYSE and Nasdaq not to disqualify independent
186
directors for ownership of even a significant amount of stock.”
Thus, the drafters acknowledged the issue and, standing alone,
seemed to have addressed it.
It is the SROs’ regulatory interplay with the SEC, even in the initial approval process, that cast a sinister shadow on equity ownership.
In paraphrasing the SRO position that the NYSE “does not view ownership of even a significant amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to an
187
independence finding,” the SEC release restates the position as
188
“not necessarily a bar to an independence finding.” The SROs’ position toward director equity ownership may not have been so unclear
had their regulations never been juxtaposed with the Sarbanes-Oxley
regulations.
A simple change in SEC taxonomy might remedy some of the
angst. The SEC and SROs’ concurrent use of the term “independence” with different meanings under either scheme is a part of the
189
The statutory authority to create the audit committee
problem.
190
rules does not require use of the term “independent.” As the new184

Indeed, the NYSE acknowledges the value of equity ownership by directors and
officers. Id. § 309.00.
185
Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change, 68
Fed. Reg. 19,051, 19,061 (Apr. 17, 2003).
186
Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,169 (Nov. 12, 2003).
187
Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change, 68
Fed. Reg. at 19,053.
188
Id. at 19,061 (emphasis added).
189
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
190
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. IV 2004). Audit committee members must be
members of the board of directors and “otherwise be independent.” Id. § 78j1(m)(3)(A). “Independent” is only defined for purposes of the paragraph it is in. Id.
§ 78j-1(m)(3)(B). The SEC already provided for a different usage of the term “affiliate” in the new rule. Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10A-3(b)(1)(ii) (2006). “Affiliate” would otherwise have the meaning Congress
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comer to the corporate governance regulatory field,
the SEC
should consider replacing “independent” with a term that more
192
clearly differentiates the two regimes.
Moreover, a change in the taxonomy would serve the preeminent Sarbanes-Oxley goal: protecting investors by improving the ac193
curacy of corporate disclosures.
Each director’s independence
status and how that status was determined must be disclosed in a
194
If the differing stancompany’s proxy statement or Form 10-K.
dards are not made clear to investors then the confusion this Com195
ment takes issue with will ultimately devolve to the public.
B. The SRO Policies Favor Director Equity Ownership
Although the SEC and the SROs share similar roles in the marketplace, the goals of the SROs’ new regulations address important
areas other than those addressed by the SEC. Like the SEC’s market
196
oversight role, the SROs are charged with designing rules “to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, [and] to pro197
mote just and equitable principles of trade.”
To that end, the SEC
and the SROs share a common stance on audit committee member198
ship, which includes an apparent hostility toward those members

gave it under the Investment Company Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(19). “Independent”
was not previously defined and should therefore be less constrained in its use. See id.
§ 78c(a).
191
Sarbanes-Oxley is an unprecedented shift into direct federal regulation of corporate governance. Jill E. Fisch, The New Federal Regulation of Corporate Governance, 28
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 42 (2004); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, Corporate
Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2004); cf. Robert B. Ahdieh, From “Federalization” to
“Mixed Governance” in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFFALO L. REV.
721, 744 (2005).
192
See supra note 13 (suggesting “outside” director as a suitable replacement based
on the accepted definition of that term).
193
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (“An Act
[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws . . . .”).
194
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt.
195
See supra Part III. Note that the SEC’s and SROs’ respective positions on equity
ownership are not their only inconsistent position. Id. While some overlap exists,
there are some criteria under the SRO regulations that do not exist under SEC rules.
Id.
196
See generally SEC, THE INVESTOR’S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS,
MAINTAINS MARKET INTEGRITY, AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION (Sept. 11, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
197
15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2000).
198
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.06 (requiring compliance with Exchange
Act Rule 10A-3, as mandated by 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A)).
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199

with large equity stakes. Their common goal is to improve independent review and to provide a check on a company’s financial con200
However, the additional SRO regulations seem geared more
trols.
toward their broader decree to perfect a “free and open market . . .
201
and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest.”
The
reasoning underlying the SROs’ criteria for additional committees—
and the board itself—supports taking an approach favoring equity
ownership.
First, the SROs’ initial requirement mandates a board comprised
202
of a majority of independent directors.
The goal of this requirement is to increase the “quality of board oversight” and reduce con203
flicts of interest.
The SROs serve each of these purposes by encouraging director equity ownership.
Improved board oversight results from an active board, and equity ownership ensures an active board. Like the SROs, commentators have criticized the boards of public companies for their “failure
to engage in the kind of active management oversight that results in
204
more effective corporate performance.”
Commentators praise active board involvement as a means of improving corporate perform205
ance and management accountability, leading companies to inno206
In empirical studies
vate ways to stimulate a more active board.
examining key indicators of board performance, equity ownership
correlates with better management oversight and more effective
199

See supra Part IV.
Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18788, 18789 (Apr. 9, 2003).
201
15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2000); see also NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 301.00
(“[C]onsistent with the Exchange’s long-standing commitment to encourage high
standards of corporate democracy, every listed company is expected to follow certain
practices aimed at maintaining appropriate standards of corporate responsibility, integrity and accountability to shareholders.”).
202
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.01.
203
Id. § 303A.01 cmt.
204
E.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Management Turnover, 54 BUS. LAW. 885, 891 (1999).
205
Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance
of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1298, 1317–18 (demonstrating a significant correlation between improved corporate performance and an
“active, independent board” through observation of board activism). See generally
Kaja Whitehouse, Move Over, CEO: Here Come the Directors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at
R1.
206
See Gaston Ceron, Musical Board Chairs: Some Companies Hope That by Rotating
Lead Directors, They’ll Bring a Greater Array of Ideas to the Table; But This Approach Comes
with a Price, WALL ST. J., Jun. 21, 2004, at R5 (describing recent corporate practice of
rotating key board positions among directors to increase director participation, despite concerns about continuity in leadership).
200
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207

boards.
But to have such a desirable effect on director behavior,
208
Thus, improvement of
their equity ownership must be substantial.
the “quality of board oversight” is achieved through encouraging substantial equity ownership.
209
The SROs are also concerned about conflicts of interest.
Equity ownership aligns a director’s interest with that of the sharehold210
211
ers, and reduces the director’s personal interest in her position.
The basic tenets of independence and equity ownership can be
viewed as intertwined notions, each fueling the other. Independence
from management—as well as freedom from other personal or financial interests—ensure objectivity in oversight, while an equity stake
212
ensures that the objectivity is exercised effectively.
Absent equity
ownership, directors’ motives are to collect their personal compensation and avoid liability—a virtual invitation to shirk performance and
213
In stark contrast to equity
a conflict of interest in its own right.
ownership, having only personal compensation at stake might lead a
director to value his position as director more than the performance
214
of the company, a result at odds with the desire to reduce conflicts
of interest. In this view, “[i]ndependence and equity ownership, act215
ing in tandem, are the keys to effective corporate governance.”
Thus a board with a majority of directors having a substantial equity
stake will achieve the SROs’ objectives in requiring a majority of independent directors by reducing the potential for conflicts of interest, and increasing the quality of management oversight and corporate performance.
Second, the SROs require listed companies to have a compensa216
tion committee comprised entirely of independent directors.
The
207

E.g., Bhagat et al., supra note 204, at 921. The authors use firm financial performance and likelihood of CEO turnover during times of poor performance as indications of effective board oversight. Id. 885–90. Based on a survey of 449 U.S.
companies, the authors conclude that “better management monitoring and substantial board equity ownership are correlated.” Id. at 921.
208
Charles M. Elson et al., Corporate Governance Reform and Reemergence from Bankruptcy: Putting the Structure Back in Restructuring, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1917, 1923 (2002);
see Bhagat et al., supra note 204, at 919.
209
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.01 cmt.
210
See supra Part IV.
211
See Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1380–81 (Del. 1995).
212
See Charles M. Elson, Enron and the Necessity of the Objective Proximate Monitor, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 496, 498 (2004).
213
See id.
214
See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1380–81.
215
Elson, supra note 212, at 499.
216
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.05.
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compensation committee is responsible for reviewing corporate goals
related to CEO compensation, reviewing the CEO’s performance,
and determining the CEO’s compensation based on its evaluation, as
well as recommending executive and other compensation plans and
producing reports on executive compensation for inclusion in the
217
company’s proxy statement. These duties require directors with interests adverse to the executives to ensure that these decisions are
based on merit rather than comity. An equity position would ensure
that directors’ interests are adverse to management’s on compensa218
tion issues.
By increasing their ownership stake, directors will have
every incentive to seek performance for the executives’ compensation, where directors with a minimal interest would be more yield219
Making equity ownership synonymous with independence
ing.
would further the SROs’ purpose in requiring an independent compensation committee.
Third, as they do for the compensation committee, the SRO
regulations require a nominating committee comprised entirely of
220
independent directors.
The responsibilities of the nominating
committee are to identify qualified persons to nominate for board
membership, develop corporate governance guidelines, and oversee
221
As in other areas,
the evaluation of management and the board.
those directors whose interests are aligned with the shareholders’
through equity ownership are more likely to act consistent with
222
shareholders’ desires.

217

Id. § 303A.05(b)(i)(A)–(C).
Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation: A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L.
REV. 937, 982–83 (1993).
Nowhere would the positive effect of a personally-motivated outside directorship be more evident than in the area of executive compensation. Overcompensation is the result of ineffective bargaining. People
without great incentive to press for position rarely do. Equity ownership would align the position of the outside director with that of the
group most disadvantaged by unreasonable compensation, the shareholders.
Id.
219
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 74 (2003) (stating that directors typically have only a
nominal equity interest in the firm and thus have little incentive to fight the CEO on
compensation issues); see also Chandler & Strine, supra note 72, at 991 (stating that
venture capitalists with substantial equity positions have a strong incentive to monitor
“managerial rent-seeking”).
220
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.04.
221
Id. § 303A.04(b)(i).
222
See supra Part IV.
218
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Moreover, proposed corporate governance reforms evince a
more general policy that encourages stock owners to be involved in
the tasks performed by the nominating committee, in contrast to a
policy of financially disinterested directors. In recent years, commentators have called for shareholder ability to directly initiate corporate
governance reform in order to increase director accountability to
223
shareholders. In fact, the SEC has considered a “direct access” rule
that would permit shareholders owning five percent or more of the
224
company to nominate directors, in certain circumstances. Such reforms, if enacted, would be difficult to square with a policy of denying
nominating committee membership to large shareholders, who
would presumably be able to nominate directors and initiate governance policy under those reforms.
C. Advancing SRO Policy by Closing the Gaps
If the SROs left equity ownership out of the independence determination it would eliminate the need to suspend otherwise valid
corporate governance reforms for companies falling under the controlled company exemption. “Controlled companies” are those companies in which more than half of the voting power is concentrated in
225
a person, group, or parent company.
A company fitting this classification is exempt from compliance with the requirement of a majority of independent directors as well as all of those related to the com226
By suspending these
pensation and nominating committees.
requirements for controlled companies the SROs defeat the sound
policy goals served by the regulations’ enactment.
The “controlled company” exemption introduces several issues.
First, the exemption permits board and committee membership by
any person, regardless of his or her ties to management or insider po227
sitions. This is contrary to the audit committee requirements which
228
Second, the threshold at
make no exemption for company size.
223

Bebchuk, supra note 156, at 884.
Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48626, 68
Fed. Reg. 60784, 60789-90 (Oct. 23, 2003) (discussing proposed Rule 14a-11 which
would enable persons that have a five percent beneficial ownership to nominate a
director when either a company nominee has received thirty-five percent “withhold”
votes, or a prior proxy proposal for a “direct access” procedure received more than
fifty percent support in a prior vote).
225
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00.
226
Id.
227
Subject only to the audit committee requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley. See
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00.
228
Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,804 (Apr. 9, 2003).
224
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fifty percent ownership seems in effect to be an arbitrary concession,
as shareholders holding smaller fractions of ownership have similar
rights, but no comparable protections exist for them. Third, for persons close to the threshold, it creates a perverse incentive simply to
acquire or retain a voting position that exceeds the threshold to
claim the exemption.
The exemption also invites the potential for abuse, such as
achieving the exemption through a firm capitalization that creates
substantial voting interest in classes of shares held by the exemptionseekers, where those persons have in fact only a minimal equity stake
229
This structure provides complete voting control
in the company.
without the positive incentives attendant to equity ownership. This is
possible because the exemption applies to persons beneficially own230
ing voting shares, as opposed to simply “stock” or “equity.”
Finally, other less flagrant means of circumventing the SRO
regulations may have similar counterproductive results. A basic example is board stacking. A director with a substantial equity stake
who is dissuaded from asserting his independence might seek to increase the board size to add an offsetting independent director, and
not run afoul of the rule requiring a majority of independent direc231
232
tors. While within the confines of the regulations, board stacking
is a problem in its own right; empirical evidence demonstrates that
233
larger boards tend to harm firm performance.
Leaving the SRO
regulatory framework intact for all listed companies and acknowledgSection 10A(m) of the Exchange Act makes no distinction based on an
issuer’s size. As discussed in the Proposing Release, we think that improvements in the financial reporting process for companies of all sizes are important for promoting investor confidence in our markets. In this regard, because there have been instances of financial fraud at small companies
as well as at large companies, we think that improving the effectiveness
of audit committees of small and large companies is important.
Id. (emphasis added).
229
See Solomon, supra note 115, at C1. (“They also raise troubling issues at companies where a controlling shareholder may have substantial voting interest but a
small economic stake, the critics say.”).
230
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00.
231
Cf. Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder
Voting Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1111,
1112 (2005) (discussing board stacking in the context of takeover defenses and
shareholder voting rights manipulation).
232
The regulations address classified boards, NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 304.00,
but do not set a limit on the total number of directors.
233
See, e.g., Jennifer G. Hill, Deconstructing Sunbeam—Contemporary Issues in Corporate
Governance, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1099, 1104–05 (1999); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting
the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception,
Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 293 (2004).
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ing the positive effect that equity ownership has in ensuring independence and performance eliminates these issues by permitting uniform application of SRO policy to all listed companies.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current regulatory framework supplied by Sarbanes-Oxley
and the SROs has introduced ambiguity into the definition of independence for directors who own substantial blocks of company stock.
In defining the contours of independence, the SEC and the SROs
have taken inconsistent positions, placing an uncertain taint on director equity ownership that runs counter to the traditional legal under234
standing of its role.
While a change in SEC taxonomy could alleviate some confusion, the SRO regulations need a shift in posture.
Because equity ownership furthers their corporate governance
objectives, the SROs should encourage equity ownership by all direc235
tors.
Taking the strong position that equity ownership will not adversely affect any finding of “independent” status under the SRO
regulations would clarify the uncertain regulatory framework. Moreover, this position would reduce or possibly eliminate the need for a
controlled company exemption and other regulatory evasions,
thereby ensuring that the rest of the regulations’ well reasoned criteria are intact for those companies that would otherwise rely on the
exemptions. As a result, the SROs would more equitably further their
regulatory objectives and restore equity ownership to its rightful position as a positive incentive to ensure good corporate performance.

234
235

See Chandler & Strine, supra note 72, at 992.
See supra Parts IV–V.

